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 Rechterlijke motiveringsplicht, in het bijzon-
der in een systeem van verkorte wijze van 
afdoening. In casu mocht de Noorse hoger 
beroepsrechter gelet op de gang van zaken in 
eerste aanleg niet volstaan met het oordeel dat 
het hoger beroep kennelijk geen kans van sla-
gen heeft. 
 Klager in deze zaak is een Noorse burger die opkomt 
tegen de weigering van het gerechtshof (rechtspre-
kend in tweede instantie) om zijn hoger beroep in 
behandeling te nemen. Klager en zijn inmiddels 
voormalige vrouw hebben in 1990 en 1995 hu-
welijkse voorwaarden vastgesteld. In 1995 zijn zij 
overeengekomen dat zij elk vijftig procent van het 
onroerend goed ‘Ekheim’ bezitten. Na de scheiding 
heeft het stadsgerecht in 2001 geoordeeld dat de 
huwelijkse voorwaarden rechtsgeldig zijn en dat de 
overeenkomst omtrent mede-eigendom niet rechts-
geldig is. De voormalige vrouw van de klager heeft 
daarna het onroerend goed verkocht aan een ven-
nootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid. Klager 
was van mening dat zijn ex-vrouw alleen bevoegd 
was om de helft van het onroerend goed in eigen-
dom over te dragen en startte daarom een civiele 
procedure bij het stadsgerecht. Dit gerecht ging niet 
mee met de stelling van de klager en verwees daar-
bij naar de eerdere uitspraak uit 2001. Klager is 
hierna in hoger beroep gegaan bij het gerechtshof. 
Hij beklaagt zich over (vermeende) verwarring over 
zijn pleidooi en verwijzingen naar de doctrine. Ook 
beklaagt hij zich over de aanzienlijke beperking van 
de totale omvang van de hoorzitting: van drie dagen 
tot vijf uur. Dit beperkte hem in zijn mogelijkheid 
om getuigen te laten horen. Het gerechtshof wei-
gerde het hoger beroep in behandeling te nemen. 
Dit deed het hof op grond van  artikel 29-13 lid 2 
Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering, waarin 
staat dat het een hoger beroep, dat kennelijk geen 
kans van slagen heeft, kan weigeren. Een gang naar 
de hoogste rechter heeft geleid tot een vergelijkbare 
uitkomst. 
 Klager wendt zich tot het EHRM en doet een be-
roep op  artikel 6 lid 1 EVRM. De uitspraak van het 
gerechtshof mist volgens klager een toereikende 
motivering. Volgens de staat is de zaak door de na-
tionale rechters zorgvuldig bekeken alvorens een 
uitspraak is gedaan over de kans van slagen van het 
hoger beroep. 
 Het Hof overweegt dat de bevoegdheid van het 
gerechtshof zich niet alleen uitstrekt tot rechts- en 
procedurele vragen maar ook tot vragen omtrent 
de feiten. In de voorliggende zaak is de mogelijkheid 
van de klager om onder andere getuigenbewijs te 
leveren aanzienlijk beperkt. Het Straatsburgse Hof 
overweegt daarom dat het niet overtuigd is dat de 
motivering van het gerechtshof recht doet aan zijn 
rol als hoger beroepsinstantie, die belast is met de 
uitvoering van een volledige inhoudelijke toets met 
‘full jurisdiction’. Door de tekortschietende motive-
ring kon de klager ook niet effectief in cassatie gaan 
bij de hoogste nationale rechter. 
 Het Hof neemt om deze redenen een schending 
aan van  artikel 6 lid 1 EVRM. 
 Hansen, 
 t. 
 Noorwegen. 
 The Law 
 I. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the 
Convention 
 47.  The applicant complained that in its 
decision of 12 June 2008 the High Court had 
dismissed his appeal against the City Court's 
judgment of 21 January 2008 without providing 
adequate reasons, in breach of the fair hearing 
guarantee in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, 
which reads as follows: 
 “In the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations …, everyone is entitled to a fair … 
hearing … by [a] … tribunal …” 
 48.  The Government contested that argu-
ment. 
 A. Admissibility 
 1. The Government's submissions 
 49.  The Government disputed the appli-
cability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to the 
impugned decision taken by the High Court to 
refuse to admit the applicant's appeal for exa-
mination on the merits. Although the dispute 
was one that concerned his ‘civil rights’, the de-
cision in question could not be said to constitute 
a ‘determination’ of that right within the me-
aning of Article 6 § 1. In this connection, relying 
on  Athanassoglou and Others v. Switzerland [GC] 
(no. 27644/95, § 43, ECHR 2000-IV), the Govern-
ment emphasised that  ‘[t]he outcome of the pro-
ceedings must be directly decisive for the right 
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in question’ and that  ‘mere tenuous connections 
or remote consequences [were] not sufficient to 
bring Article 6 § 1 into play’ . Moreover, in  Gorou v. 
Greece (no. 2) [GC] (no. 12686/03, § 29, 20 March 
2009) the Grand Chamber had held that  ‘in as-
sessing whether there [was] a dispute over a civil 
right, one must look beyond the appearances and 
the language used and concentrate on the reali-
ties of the situation … according to the circums-
tances of each case’ . 
 50.  The Government submitted that in the 
instant case the 2001 judgment of the City Court 
was final and also settled the dispute between 
the parties to the 2008 proceedings. The decision 
concerning the appeal to the High Court in 2008, 
however, determined a different question, na-
mely whether or not the applicant's case should 
be examined again. The High Court's decision — 
having regard to  ‘the realities of the situation’ in 
the circumstances of the applicant's case — had 
only tenuous connections or remote consequen-
ces to the ‘civil right’ in question. It differed, for 
example, from a decision that either confirmed or 
quashed a previous judgment. 
 51.  Thus, with reference to the particular cir-
cumstances of the case, the Government invited 
the Court to hold that Article 6 § 1 did not apply 
to the case at hand and to declare the application 
inadmissible as being incompatible  ratione mate-
riae with the provisions of the Convention, in ac-
cordance with Article 35 §§ 3(a) and 4. 
 2. The applicant's submissions 
 52.  The applicant, disagreeing with the Go-
vernment, maintained that from the Court's case-
law it followed that the scope of applicability of 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention ought not to be in-
terpreted restrictively. Not only the City Court but 
also the High Court expressly determined the pri-
vate property rights of the applicant and their de-
cisions were ‘directly decisive’ for the existence, 
scope or modalities of the rights and obligations 
concerned. 
 53.  The Government's suggestion that the 
2001 proceedings provided a final determination 
of the applicant's property rights and that the 
2008 proceedings simply regarded the question 
of whether the case should be examined again 
was incorrect. Whilst it was true that the 2008 
proceedings concerned some elements that had 
also been assessed during the 2001 proceedings, 
in the 2008 case the applicant also presented se-
veral arguments that had not been examined in 
the 2001 case, notably circumstances occurred 
after the 2001 judgment (see paragraph 11 (d) 
above). The 2008 proceedings clearly consisted of 
more than a simple review of the 2001 judgment, 
as was confirmed by the fact that in 2008 the City 
Court held a hearing and delivered a judgment in 
a procedure for decision on the merits, instead of 
dismissing the case as having been previously de-
cided. 
 54.  Thus, both formally and substantively, 
the 2008 proceedings involved a ‘determination’ 
of the applicant's private property rights. Article 6 
§ 1 was accordingly applicable to the proceedings 
at issue. 
 3. Assessment by the Court 
 55.  The Court, having regard to the appli-
cant's submissions to the City Court in the pro-
ceedings leading to its judgment of 2008 and its 
own case-law, is satisfied that they concerned a 
dispute over a civil right, namely his claim against 
the respondent company of a right of ownership 
to a part of the property in question, that could 
be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recog-
nised under domestic law (see, for instance,  Vilho 
Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, 
§ 40, ECHR 2007-II; and  K.T. v. Norway , no. 
26664/03, § 82, 25 September 2008). The dispute 
was genuine and serious; it related not only to 
the actual existence of a right but also to its scope 
and the manner of its exercise (ibid.). The Court 
further observes that the City Court rejected the 
applicant's claim on the ground that the com-
pany had derived his rights from the applicant's 
former wife and that the City Court had previous-
ly ruled in her favour in its 2001 judgment. The 
City Court's 2008 judgment must be considered 
to have determined the dispute since, following 
the High Court's refusal to admit the appeal, 
the result of these proceedings seen as a whole 
was directly decisive for the right in question 
(ibid.). Article 6 § 1 was accordingly applicable 
to those proceedings. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court is aware that, as noted in  Valchev and 
Others v. Bulgaria (dec.) nos. 47450/11, 26659/12 
and 53966/12, 21 January 2014), there have been 
cases in which such proceedings were found not 
to involve a ‘determination’ of the applicant's 
‘civil rights’ and the provision was therefore con-
sidered inapplicable (ibid., § 72). However, the 
prevailing approach seems to be that Article 6 § 1 
is applicable also to leave-to-appeal proceedings 
(ibid., §§ 69–71;  Monnell and Morris v. the United 
Kingdom , 2 March 1987, § 54, Series A no. 115; and 
 Martinie v. France [GC], no. 58675/00, §§ 11 and 
53–55, ECHR 2006-VI), and that the manner of its 
application depends on the special features of the 
proceedings involved, account being taken of the 
entirety of the proceedings conducted in the do-
mestic legal order and of the role of the appellate 
or cassation court therein ( Monnell and Morris , 
cited above, § 56). 
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 56.  The Court is therefore unable to agree 
with the Government that the applicant's com-
plaint is incompatible  ratione materiae with the 
provisions of the Convention. Nor does the Court 
find that the application is manifestly ill-founded 
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the 
Convention or that it is inadmissible on any other 
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissi-
ble. 
 B. Merits 
 1. The applicant's submissions 
 57.  The applicant maintained that, due to 
the lack of reasoning in the High Court's decision 
of 12 June 2008 dismissing his appeal, it was not 
apparent that his appeal had been reviewed in a 
manner complying with the Article 6 § 1 require-
ments. 
 58.  Like in  Hirvisaari v. Finland (no. 49684/99, 
§§ 31–32, 27 September 2001), his appeal to the 
High Court had to a large extent concerned the 
inadequacy of the first-instance Court's reaso-
ning, in particular the City Court's confusion re-
garding the applicant's arguments on points of 
law and its refusal to hear certain witnesses. 
 59.  Whilst an appellate court could, in prin-
ciple, endorse the reasons of the lower Court's de-
cision ( Meltex Ltd and Movsesyan v. Armenia , no. 
32283/04, § 88, 17 June 2008), the High Court had 
not done so in the applicant's case. Paraphrasing 
the provision in question, it had merely stated 
that it found it ‘clear’ that the appeal would not 
succeed. This was not the same as endorsing a 
decision explicitly. Indeed, provided it upheld the 
first-instance Court's conclusion, the High Court 
could dismiss an appeal without giving reasons, 
even if it disagreed with the latter's reasoning 
and the first-instance court procedure suffered 
from deficiencies. 
 60.  Even when an appellate court simply en-
dorsed the reasons of the lower Court's decision, 
Article 6 § 1 required that the appellate court  ‘did 
in fact address the essential issues which were 
submitted to its jurisdiction and did not merely 
endorse without further ado the findings reached 
by the lower court’ ( Helle v. Finland , 19 Decem-
ber 1997, § 60,  Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
1997-VIII). In the applicant's case, the possibility 
of verifying whether the High Court had done so 
was non-existent (in contrast to  Meltex Ltd and 
Movsesyan , cited above, § 88, where this trans-
pired from the relevant national judgments). 
 61.  The High Court should at least have pro-
vided ‘very limited reasoning’. The Strasbourg 
Court had accepted that this could satisfy the 
Article 6 requirement  ‘where a Supreme Court 
refused to accept a case on the basis that the legal 
grounds for such a case had not been made out’ 
( Marini v. Albania , no. 3738/02, § 106, ECHR 2007-
XIV (extracts)). 
 62.  The extent of the requirement to give 
reasons depended not on the form but rather on 
the substance of the decision. The condition for 
rejecting an appeal under Article 29-13 (2) of the 
Code of Civil Procedure (i.e. that the High Court 
 ‘[found] it clear that the appeal [would] not suc-
ceed’ ), reflected that such a decision effectively 
determined the subject matter of the case and 
explained why the reasons ought to be thorough 
in order to be deemed adequate for the purposes 
of Article 6 § 1. 
 63.  In the present case, a number of factors 
spoke in favour of requiring the High Court to 
state adequate reasons and for rejecting the Go-
vernment's invitation to the Court to rely on its 
previous rulings in which it had accepted that ap-
pellate courts give limited or even no reasoning 
when rejecting an appeal: 
 (i)  The case-law in question was very speci-
fic and had been limited to dealing with decisi-
ons taken by national supreme- or constitutional 
courts or similar tribunals of last and final juris-
diction, with inherent features suggesting a more 
lenient duty to state reasons (see for instance, 
 X v. Germany , (dec.) no. 8769/79, 16 July 1981; 
 Müller-Eberstein v. Germany (dec.), no. 29753/96, 
27 November 1996;  Immeubles Groupe Kosser v. 
France (dec.), no. 38748/97, 9 March 1999;  Buf-
ferne v. France (dec.), no. 54367/00, ECHR 2002-
III (extracts));  Burg and Others v. France (dec.), 
no. 34763/02, ECHR 2003-II;  Sale v. France , no. 
39765/04, 21 March 2006);  Nerva and Others v. 
the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 42295/98, 11 July 
2000;  Sawoniuk v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 
63716/00, ECHR 2001-VI; and  E.M. v. Norway 
(dec.), no. 20087/92, 26 October 1995). 
 (ii)  That case-law had generally concerned 
situations where the merits of the case had been 
thoroughly assessed in two lower instances and 
where a reduced requirement for stating reasons 
in the last and final instance refusing the appeal 
had been justified. However, the merits of the 
present case had not been thoroughly assessed 
even once. Although the City Court had accepted 
to hear the case on the merits (thus accepting 
that the 2001 proceedings were not legally bin-
ding on the 2008 proceedings), it had conside-
rably restricted the scope of the hearing by not 
allowing the applicant to examine any witnesses 
or present any other evidence, thereby generally 
preventing him from putting forth his arguments. 
Despite his having pointed to these errors in his 
appeal (see paragraph 11 above), the High Court 
had failed to hear oral argument and to take any 
steps to rectify them. All it did before rejecting the 
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 2. The Government's submissions 
 65.  The Government maintained that, as a 
point of departure, it ought to be emphasised that 
the impugned decision of the High Court had in 
fact contained reasons, namely by stating that is 
was ‘clear’ to High Court that the appeal  ‘had no 
prospect of success’ . This was sufficient under the 
Court's case-law (see  Gorou , cited above, § 41). 
 66.  The Government contested the appli-
cant's unsubstantiated view that the High Court's 
decision did not demonstrate that his appeal had 
been subjected to such review as was required by 
Norwegian law and the Court's Article 6 § 1 case-
law. When the three judges comprising the High 
Court had unanimously stated that they found 
it clear that the appeal had no prospect of suc-
cess, it ought to be assumed that their decision 
had in fact been based on a careful review of the 
City Court's judgment, the applicant's appeal and 
three written pleadings. The applicant's allegati-
ons to the contrary suggested that they had ne-
glected their professional duties. 
 67.  It was true, as the applicant pointed out, 
that it would have been possible for the High 
Court to refuse to admit the appeal even if it did 
not fully agree with the lower Court's reasoning 
provided that it agreed with the conclusion. Ho-
wever, this was a merely hypothetical scenario as 
the present case was clear-cut and could not have 
been decided in any other way. 
 68.  The case-law which the applicant prayed 
in aid had in fact little bearing on the concrete as-
sessment which the Court was called on to make 
in this case. The Government found no compel-
ling reasons for distinguishing filtering based on a 
refusal of admission of an appeal (paragraph 2 of 
Article 29-13 of the Code of Civil Procedure) from 
the type based on leave-to-appeal procedure 
(paragraph 1 of the said provision). Even though 
they represented two different systems of appeal 
they both served the same filtering purpose and 
might produce the same results depending on 
the circumstances. Were the requirement to pro-
vide reasons in the procedure at issue here to be 
stricter than was the case with regard to leave-to-
appeal proceedings, it would have the unfortuna-
te consequence of encouraging States to offer the 
latter kind which was less furnished with Article 
6 guarantees. 
 69.  The Government were thus of the opini-
on that the reasoning provided by the High Court 
in the case under consideration satisfied the ‘fair 
hearing’ requirement in Article 6 § 1 of the Con-
vention. 
 70.  In this connection, account ought to be 
taken of  ‘the entirety of the proceedings’ (see, 
amongst other authorities,  Sutter v. Switzerland , 
22 February 1984, § 28, Series A no. 74; and  Mon-
appeal was to obtain one set of written pleadings 
from the applicant (who was not represented 
by counsel at the domestic level). Thus, a strict 
requirement ought clearly to apply to the High 
Court's reasoning. 
 (iii)  Whereas the above case-law commonly 
related to provisions offering a court of last and 
final jurisdiction the possibility of granting leave 
to appeal, the present case concerned a situation 
where the legislator had opted for a provision of-
fering the applicant a right to appeal to the High 
Court (Article 29-13 (2) of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure). This was presumably on the ground that 
the former type of appeal scheme (which was the 
rule of appeal to the Supreme Court, see Article 
30-4 (1) of the Code) would offer insufficient le-
gal protection where the case had only been re-
viewed once, at first instance. 
 (iv)  While the said case-law had generally 
concerned appeals limited to questions of law, 
as was common for appeals to a court of last and 
final jurisdiction, an appeal to the High Court, as 
was the situation here, could concern questions 
of fact, law and procedure (Article 29-3 (1) of the 
Code). Since the High Court failed to state any 
reasons for its decision it was impossible to un-
derstand why it had found it  ‘clear that the appeal 
will not succeed’ (Article 29-13 (2) of the Code). 
 (v)  The aforementioned case-law com-
monly concerned situations where the decision 
in question could not itself form the subject of 
a further appeal and the need for reasoning was 
accordingly more limited. In contrast, in the case 
at hand, the High Court's decision was one that 
could be appealed to the Supreme Court under 
Article 30-1(1) of the Code but, because it stated 
no reasons, it would be impossible for the ap-
pellate court to review it. Since Norwegian law 
provided that a High Court decision could be ap-
pealed, the decision ought to be reasoned in such 
a manner as to enable the Appeals Leave Com-
mittee of the Supreme Court to carry out a review 
of the High Court procedure. In this context, the 
applicant prayed in aid the  Hadjianastassiou v. 
Greece judgment (16 December 1992, § 33, Series 
A no. 252). 
 64.  The latter point had also been stressed by 
the Supreme Court when modifying its practice 
in criminal procedure to the effect that a dismis-
sal of an appeal must state the reasons as a conse-
quence of the requirement in Article 14 (5) of the 
Covenant (see paragraph 35 above). In addition, 
the applicant argued, the lack of reasons in the 
High Court's decision had prevented public scru-
tiny of the administration of justice. 
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 the Helle v. Finland judgment of 19 December 
1997,  Reports 1997-VIII, p. 2930, §§ 59–60).” 
 72.  The Court has also stated that a lower 
court (or authority) in turn must give such rea-
sons as to enable the parties to make effective 
use of any existing right of appeal (see  Hadji-
anastassiou , cited above, § 33;  Hirvisaari , cited 
above, § 30; and  Sanchez Cardenas v. Norway , 
no. 12148/03, § 49, 4 October 2007). The Court's 
task is to consider whether the method adopted 
in this respect has led in a given case to results 
which are compatible with the Convention (see 
 Hadjianastassiou , ibid.). 
 73.  Furthermore, the manner of application 
of Article 6 to proceedings before courts of ap-
peal depends on the special features of the pro-
ceedings involved; account must be taken of the 
entirety of the proceedings in the domestic legal 
order and of the role of the appellate court the-
rein (see  Ekbatani v. Sweden , 26 May 1988, § 27, 
Series A no. 134; and  Monnell and Morris , cited 
above, § 56). In order to determine whether the 
requirements of fairness in Article 6 were met in 
the present case, it is necessary to consider mat-
ters such as the nature of the filtering procedure 
and its significance in the context of the civil 
proceedings as a whole, the scope of the powers 
of the High Court, and the manner in which the 
applicant's interests were actually presented and 
protected before the High Court ( Monnell and 
Morris , cited above, ibid.). 
 74.  In this context it should be borne in mind 
that, with regard to the decision of an appellate 
court on whether to grant leave to appeal, the 
Court has held that Article 6 § 1 cannot be in-
terpreted as requiring that the rejection of such 
leave be subject itself to a requirement to give 
detailed reasons (see  Sawoniuk , cited above). 
 (b)  Application of the above principles to the 
present case 
 75.  Turning to the particular circumstances 
of the present case, the Court first notes the appli-
cant's argument that, in view of the shortcomings 
in the City Court's procedure and reasoning, the 
High Court should have given more detailed rea-
sons for its refusal of admission in the instant 
case. In his appeal to the High Court, he had com-
plained of the City Court's decision to shorten the 
overall duration of the hearing from the three 
days initially scheduled to five hours, including 
the hearing of the applicant's witnesses and the 
presentation of documentary evidence, and of 
the City Court's assessment of the legal issues to 
be determined. 
 76.  However, the Court observes that the 
City Court had held an adversarial hearing at 
which both parties were heard and evidence was 
nell and Morris , cited above, § 56), notably the 
reasons contained in the City Court's judgment, 
from which it transpired that the applicant's le-
gal arguments had no prospects of success what-
soever. Regard must also be had the procedural 
safeguards that applied when a first instance 
judgment was appealed. In particular, before de-
livering its decision the High Court had warned 
the applicant that it envisaged refusing to admit 
his appeal and had in accordance with Article 20-
13(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure given him 
an opportunity to comment, of which he availed 
himself. Thus the procedure conducted by the 
High Court before taking its decision fully com-
plied with the right to an adversarial process gu-
aranteed by the right to a ‘fair hearing’ in Article 
6 § 1 (see  Vermeulen v. Belgium , 20 February 1996, 
§ 33,  Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-I). 
 3. The Court's assessment 
 (a)  General principles 
 71.  The Court reiterates that while the Con-
vention does not compel the Contracting States to 
set up courts of appeal or of cassation and does 
not guarantee a right to appeal as such in civil ca-
ses, a State which does so is required to ensure 
that persons amenable to the law shall enjoy 
before these courts the fundamental guarantees 
contained in Article 6 ( Delcourt v. Belgium , 17 Ja-
nuary 1970, p. 14, Series A no. 11). As to the requi-
rement to state reasons, which is at issue in the 
case under consideration, in  García Ruiz v. Spain 
[GC], no. 30544/96, § 26, ECHR 1999-I, it held as 
follows: 
 “26.  … [A]ccording to its established case-
law reflecting a principle linked to the proper 
administration of justice, judgments of courts 
and tribunals should adequately state the rea-
sons on which they are based. The extent to 
which this duty to give reasons applies may 
vary according to the nature of the decision 
and must be determined in the light of the 
circumstances of the case (see the  Ruiz Torija 
v. Spain and  Hiro Balani v. Spain judgment s of 
9 December 1994, Series A nos. 303-A and 
303-B, p. 12, § 29, and pp. 29–30, § 27; and 
the  Higgins and Others v. France judgment of 19 
February 1998,  Reports of Judgments and Deci-
sions 1998-I, p. 60, § 42). Although Article 6 § 1 
obliges courts to give reasons for their decisi-
ons, it cannot be understood as requiring a de-
tailed answer to every argument (see the  Van 
de Hurk v. the Netherlands judgment of 19 April 
1994, Series A no. 288, p. 20, § 61). Thus, in dis-
missing an appeal, an appellate court may, in 
principle, simply endorse the reasons for the 
lower Court's decision (see,  mutatis mutandis , 
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appeal. After carrying out an examination of the 
merits of the case, normally on the basis of the 
case file, the High Court could refuse admission 
of an appeal provided that it found it ‘clear’ that 
the appeal had no prospects of success. This re-
quirement implied a high degree of certainty that 
the outcome would remain unaltered after an 
ordinary appeal hearing. It was not a condition 
for refusing admission of an appeal that the High 
Court agreed with the City Court's reasoning or 
was of the view that its reasoning would stand af-
ter the High Court's review of the case. It was suf-
ficient that the High Court found it clear that the 
outcome would be maintained, possibly on the 
basis of a different reasoning than that given by 
the City Court. It was moreover a condition that 
the three judges taking part in the decision to re-
fuse admission of an appeal unanimously found 
that the appeal would not succeed (see paragraph 
29 above). A decision to refuse admission of an 
appeal was taken at the preparatory stage of the 
proceedings (Article 29-14) and, once final, had 
the effect that the lower Court's judgment gained 
legal force (see paragraph 28 above). 
 80.  In this connection, the Court reiterates 
that  ‘as regards the preliminary procedure for the 
examination and admission of appeals on points 
of law by an organ operating within the Court of 
Cassation, it has … acknowledged that an appel-
late court is not required to give more detailed 
reasoning when it simply applies a specific legal 
provision to dismiss an appeal on points of law as 
having no prospects of success, without further 
explanation’ (see, for instance,  Gorou , cited above, 
§ 41; and  Wnuk v. Poland (dec.), no. 38308/05, 1 
September 2009, cited above, both with further 
references). This principle, which it has thus af-
firmed in such general terms, the Court has also 
applied with respect to the dismissal of an appeal 
made on factual grounds (see  Wnuk and  E.M. , 
both cited above). 
 81.  Moreover, in substance, the High Court's 
specific role at this stage of the national pro-
ceedings when  refusing admission  of an appeal can 
hardly be distinguished from that assumed by a 
national appellate court when  refusing leave to ap-
peal on the ground of no reasonable prospects of 
success. In a number of previous cases the Court 
has had to examine each type of situations and, 
without drawing any such distinction, has found 
that reasoning such as here did not give rise to a 
breach of the Article 6 fair hearing guarantee (as 
examples of the first type, see for instance,  Im-
meubles Groupe Kosser; Burg and Others ; and  Sale , 
all cited above; as examples of the second situ-
ation, see  Sawoniuk, Nerva and Others ; and  E.M. , 
all cited above). Nor has it differentiated between 
filtering decisions taken as here at second instan-
presented, the applicant having opted to plead 
his own case and his opponent being represen-
ted by a lawyer. While it is not the Court's task 
to express any view on whether the City Court's 
interpretation of Norwegian law was correct or to 
substitute its own assessment for that of the City 
Court with regard to any factual issues brought 
before it (see  Edwards v. the United Kingdom , 16 
December 1992, § 34, Series A no. 247-B;  Dombo 
Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands , 27 October 1993, 
§ 31, Series A no. 274; and  Botten v. Norway , 19 Fe-
bruary 1996, § 48,  Reports 1996-I), it finds nothing 
to indicate that the City Court transgressed the 
normal discretion enjoyed by national courts in 
assessing the admissibility and relevance of evi-
dence in cases before them and making findings 
of facts (see, for example,  Eskelinen and Others v. 
Finland , no. 43803/98, § 31, 8 August 2006;  Sara 
Lind Eggertsdóttir v. Iceland , no. 31930/04, § 44, 
5 July 2007; and  Bergsson and Others v. Iceland 
(dec.), no. 46461/06, 23 September 2008). Nor 
does it appear that the City Court's own reasoning 
was inadequate for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of 
the Convention (compare  Hirvisaari , cited above, 
§§ 31–33). There is no appearance of any failure 
on the part of the City Court to observe the Arti-
cle 6 fairness requirements in the applicant's case 
(see  Sawoniuk , cited above; and  Nerva and Others , 
cited above). 
 77.  The question nonetheless remains 
whether the High Court, notwithstanding the 
above findings, could be said to have failed to give 
sufficient reasons for its refusal of 12 June 2008 to 
admit the applicant's appeal for examination. The 
reasons stated by the High Court in the present 
case consisted of a paraphrasing of the contents 
of Article 29-13 (2), first sentence, according to 
which such admission could be refused if the 
High Court  ‘found it clear that the appeal would 
not succeed’ . 
 78.  By way of general observation, the Court 
notes that the impugned decision had been taken 
within the framework of a filtering procedure 
introduced by the 2005 Code of Civil Procedure 
in the interests of procedural economy. It was 
recognised that in order to avoid that the parties 
and the judiciary incur considerable additional 
costs there was a need to stop clearly unmeritori-
ous appeals to the High Court. Whilst the right to 
appellate review of a decision on the merits was 
deemed an important safeguard, an unlimited 
and extensive right in this respect could be coun-
terproductive to the rule of law (see paragraphs 
18, 25 and 26 above). 
 79.  The High Court's role in appeal pro-
ceedings in a civil case was not to examine 
the case afresh but to review the first-instance 
Court's decision that formed the subject of the 
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cant to exercise effectively his right to appeal (see 
 Hadjianastassiou , cited above, § 33;  Hirvisaari , ci-
ted above, § 30) against the High Court's proce-
dure to the Supreme Court, for the purposes of 
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 
 84.  There has accordingly been a violation of 
this provision. 
 II. Application of article 41 of the convention 
 85.  Article 41 of the Convention provides: 
 “If the Court finds that there has been a violati-
on of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, 
and if the internal law of the High Contracting 
Party concerned allows only partial reparation 
to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford 
just satisfaction to the injured party.” 
 A. Damage 
 86.  The applicant (1) invited the Court to 
hold that he was entitled to appropriate reme-
dies under Article 13 of the Convention, referring 
to  Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, ECHR 2000-
XI). He (2) further asked the Court to award him 
an appropriate amount of compensation for the 
non-pecuniary damage inflicted on him by the 
wrongful treatment he had suffered in the pro-
ceedings before the High Court. The fact that the 
High Court would not take his appeal seriously 
and had deprived him of basic Article 6 guaran-
tees had caused him considerable distress. 
 87.  The Government disputed item (1) abo-
ve, stressing that, in the event that the Court were 
to find a violation of the Convention, it only had 
competence to award the applicant just satisfacti-
on under Article 41. As to item (2), they requested 
the Court to reject it as being unsubstantiated. In 
any event, they were of the view that the finding 
of a violation would constitute adequate just sa-
tisfaction in the present case. 
 88.  As to item (1), the Court notes from the 
outset that the applicant did not complain of a 
violation of Article 13 of the Convention. While 
referring to the above-cited  Kudla judgment, 
he invoked this provision in asking the Court to 
hold that he was  ‘entitled to appropriate reme-
dies’ , but without elaborating specifically on the 
grounds for his request. His claim can be under-
stood to imply an invitation to the Court to indi-
cate to the respondent State what measures, be-
yond the payment of compensation under Article 
41 of the Convention, should be adopted by it to 
implement the present judgment under Article 
46. However, bearing in mind its case-law in this 
area (see, as a recent authority,  Del Rio Prada v. 
Spain ([GC], no. 42750/09, §§ 137-138 ECHR 2013, 
with further references), the Court does not find 
in the concrete circumstances of the present case 
that the violation found by it is of such a character 
ce and such decision taken at third instance (see 
other cases above). Indeed, the nature of the issue 
to be determined, namely the existence or not of 
reasonable prospects of success, is in substance 
the same. 
 82.  However, the Court observes that the 
High Court's jurisdiction was not limited to ques-
tions of law and procedure but extended also to 
questions of fact. In the case under consideration, 
the applicant appealed to the High Court against 
the City Court's examination of his pleas on points 
of law and its sudden decision to drastically shor-
ten the hearing from three days to five hours 
thereby substantially reducing his opportunity 
to adduce witness- and documentary evidence 
regarding certain issues of fact (see paragraph 13 
above). The Court is not convinced in the concrete 
circumstances that the High Court's reasoning in 
its decision of 12 June 2008 did address the es-
sence of the issue to be decided by it (compare, 
 mutatis mutandis, Helle, cited above, § 60) in a 
manner that adequately reflected its role at the 
relevant procedural stage as an appellate court 
entrusted with full jurisdiction and that it did so 
with due regard to the applicant's interests (see 
 Monnell and Morris , cited above, § 56). 
 83.  Furthermore, it should be noted that 
when refusing to admit the applicant's appeal, 
the High Court did not act as the final instance in 
so far as its procedure could form the subject of 
an appeal to the Appeals Leave Committee of the 
Supreme Court. Whilst the latter's jurisdiction did 
not extend to the merits of the applicant's appeal 
to the High Court or of the latter's refusal to admit 
his appeal (compare  Hadjianastassiou , cited abo-
ve, § 33; and  Hirvisaari, cited above, §§ 31–32), its 
review did encompass the High Court's applica-
tion of the law and assessment of the evidence 
in as much as it related to points of procedure. It 
could also review whether in the light of the High 
Court procedure, seen as a whole, it was justifi-
able from a fair hearing point of view, notably the 
guarantees in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, for 
the High Court to refuse admission of the appeal. 
This review included whether the subject matter 
could be adequately dealt with on the basis of the 
written case-file in a simplified procedure (see 
paragraph 38 above). Against this background, 
the Court cannot but welcome the developments 
in national judicial practice (see paragraph 44 
and also paragraph 35 above) and the legislative 
changes (see paragraphs 45 to 46 above) in this 
area after the impugned proceedings. Thus, while 
the said review would be based on the same case-
material as before the High Court (see paragraph 
39 above), the Court is not persuaded that the 
reasons stated by the High Court for refusing to 
admit his appeal made it possible for the appli-
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 (a)  that the finding of a violation constitutes 
sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary 
damage sustained by the applicant; 
 (b)  that the respondent State is to pay the 
applicant, within three months from the date on 
which the judgment becomes final in accordance 
with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, € 12,500 
(twelve thousand five hundred euros), plus any 
tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in 
respect of costs and expenses, to be converted 
into the currency of the respondent State at the 
rate applicable at the date of settlement; 
 (c)  that from the expiry of the above-men-
tioned three months until settlement simple in-
terest shall be payable on the above amounts at 
a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the 
European Central Bank during the default period 
plus three percentage points; 
 4.  Dismisses , unanimously, the remainder of 
the applicant's claim for just satisfaction. 
 Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 
October 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of 
the Rules of Court. 
 (…) 
 In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Con-
vention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Møse is annexed to 
this judgment. 
 Dissenting opinion of judge Møse 
 I. Introduction 
 1.  The main issue in this case is to what ex-
tent a court of appeal — acting as the second ins-
tance — is required under Article 6 § 1 of the Con-
vention to give reasons in filtering proceedings, 
and in particular whether it may limit itself to a 
general formulation to the effect that the case has 
no prospect of success. In the view of the majo-
rity, such brief reasoning was not acceptable (see 
paragraphs 82-83 of the judgment). I am not con-
vinced that this is correct. 
 2.  It is common ground that as a conse-
quence of subsequent judicial and legislative de-
velopments in Norway (see paragraphs 32 to 46) 
the situation in the  Hansen case will no longer oc-
cur. But the exact requirements of the Convention 
involve questions of principle which may arise in 
future cases. 
 3.  First, a few words about the case as it 
evolved at the national level. In 2001 Fredrikstad 
City Court gave judgment in the real-estate dis-
pute between the applicant and his former wife. 
It found against the applicant, who did not ap-
peal (see paragraph 8). In 2007 he instituted pro-
ceedings against the company which had bought 
the property. In its judgment of 21 January 2008, 
the City Court again found against the applicant, 
as to warrant indicating to the respondent State 
any individual or general measures for its domes-
tic legal order to put an end to the violation and to 
redress the effects thereof. 
 89.  As regards item (2), an award under Ar-
ticle 41 can only be based on the fact that the 
applicant did not have the benefit of all the gu-
arantees of Article 6 § 1. The Court cannot specu-
late as to the outcome of any judicial review had 
the violation of this provision not materialised in 
the instant case but is prepared to accept that the 
applicant must have suffered some anguish and 
distress therefrom. Bearing in mind the domes-
tic judicial and legislative changes related to the 
subject-matter in question (see paragraphs 44 
and 46 above), the Court considers that the pre-
sent finding of a violation constitutes adequate 
just satisfaction in this respect. 
 B. Costs and expenses 
 90.  The applicant also claimed 164,387 
Norwegian kroner (NOK) (corresponding to ap-
proximately € 21,500 on 26 March 2012) for his 
lawyers work (105 hours, including 47.50 hours at 
NOK 1,264 per hour and 46.75 hours at NOK 2,050 
per hour) in the Strasbourg proceedings, incurred 
by him on a pro bono basis. 
 91.  The Government requested the Court to 
carefully examine the claim in the light of the 
Court's case-law, according to which only costs 
that are necessarily incurred and are reasonable 
as to quantum should be reimbursed. 
 92.  According to the Court's case-law, an ap-
plicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs 
and expenses only in so far as it has been shown 
that these have been actually and necessarily in-
curred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the 
present case, regard being had to the specifica-
tion of costs submitted and the above criteria, the 
Court considers it reasonable to award the sum 
of € 12,500 for the proceedings before the Court, 
plus any tax that may be chargeable to the appli-
cant on this amount. 
 C. Default interest 
 93.  The Court considers it appropriate that 
the default interest rate should be based on the 
marginal lending rate of the European Central 
Bank, to which should be added three percentage 
points. 
 For these reasons, the court 
 1.  Declares, unanimously, the application 
admissible; 
 2.  Holds , by six votes to one, that there has 
been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention; 
 3.  Holds , unanimously, 
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reasons when exercising their filtering role. In 
most of these cases the applicants' complaints 
of insufficient reasoning were declared inadmis-
sible as manifestly ill-founded. In the very few 
judgments on the merits concerning the reasons 
in filtering proceedings, the Court did not find a 
violation of Article 6 § 1. The  Hansen judgment is 
the first time it does so. 
 8.  It may be argued that the previous cases 
focussed on filtering before national supreme 
courts, constitutional courts or courts of cassati-
on. However, that is not entirely correct. As stated 
in the judgment (see paragraph 80), the Court has 
in some cases accepted filtering decisions with 
very brief reasoning at second and third instance, 
and on the basis of legal and factual grounds. 
Indeed, paragraph 80 reiterates that  ‘an appel-
late court is not required to give more detailed 
reasoning when it simply applies a specific legal 
provision to dismiss an appeal on points of law as 
having no prospects of success, without further 
explanation’ and then refers to three cases. 
 9.  The first case is  Gorou v. Greece (no. 2) 
[GC] (no. 12686/03, 20 March 2009), where the 
prosecutor had not given reasons for rejecting a 
civil party's request that he appeal an acquittal 
to the Court of Cassation on points of law. Based 
on the individual circumstances of the case (see 
§§ 37–42), the Court found no violation of Article 
6 § 1. That case was of course different from the 
 Hansen case in several ways, but I note that the 
Court of Cassation was the second instance. 
 10.  Paragraph 80 also mentions  Wnuk v. 
Poland (dec.), no. 38308/05, 1 September 2009, 
which involved the Supreme Court as the third 
instance. That appeal included assessment of the 
evidence and the application of incorrect criteria 
by the lower courts in respect of the value of the 
appellant's claim. The Supreme Court refused to 
entertain the cassation appeal, relying on a pro-
vision concerning manifestly ill-founded appeals 
and appeals in cases where no serious legal issues 
arose. The decision, which was taken by a single 
judge sitting in camera, referred to the criteria 
listed in the provision, stated that none of the cir-
cumstances was present, and found it justified to 
refuse to entertain the cassation appeal. 
 The Court declared  Wnuk 's complaint inad-
missible. It stated that when a Supreme Court 
refuses to accept a case on the basis that the legal 
grounds for such a case are not made out, very 
limited reasoning may satisfy the requirements 
of Article 6. It also repeated the formulation in 
 Gorou and some other cases that there is no need 
for appellate courts to give detailed reasoning as 
regards points of law (see para. 10 above), and — 
again referring to case-law — did not rule out the 
possibility that, in the circumstances of a particu-
attaching particular weight to its 2001 judgment 
(see paragraphs 10 to 12). Its decision to declare 
evidence inadmissible and to shorten the pro-
ceedings was also based on the premise that the 
dispute about ownership had been decided in 
2001. 
 4.  In his appeal to Borgarting High Court the 
applicant challenged the City Court's approach 
primarily by raising various points of law, inclu-
ding alleged procedural errors. After warning the 
applicant that his appeal could be refused, exten-
ding the deadline for his comments and receiving 
two sets of submissions from him, the High Court 
by a unanimous decision of 12 June 2008 found 
it clear that the appeal would not succeed (see 
paragraphs 13 to 15). On 19 September 2008 the 
Appeals Leave Committee of the Supreme Court 
unanimously found it clear that the applicant's 
appeal would not succeed and rejected it (see pa-
ragraphs 16-17). 
 II. The Court's case-law 
 5.  I agree with the description in the judg-
ment (see paragraphs 71 to 74) of the general 
principles elaborated in the Court's case-law and 
share the view that an appeal system based on 
 refusing admission of an appeal can hardly be dis-
tinguished from a model based on  refusing leave 
to appeal on the ground of no reasonable prospect 
of success (see paragraph 81 of the judgment). 
 6.  In my view the Court has until now ap-
plied these general principles in a cautious way. 
Firstly, there has been uncertainty in the case-law 
of the Convention organs as to whether Article 6 
is applicable at all to leave-to-appeal proceedings 
and similar filtering processes. As noted in  Val-
chev and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.) nos. 47450/11, 
26659/12 and 53966/12, § 72, 21 January 2014, 
there have been cases in which such proceedings 
were found not to involve a ‘determination’ of 
the applicant's ‘civil rights’. In  Valchev the Court 
decided to leave the issue open as the applicants' 
complaint was in any event inadmissible (ibid. 
§ 73). For my part, I share the view expressed in 
the present judgment (see paragraph 55) that 
the prevailing approach seems to be that Article 
6 § 1 is applicable also to filtering proceedings. 
However, the above-mentioned discrepancy in 
the case-law on the applicability of Article 6 to fil-
tering proceedings, and the fact that the Court as 
recently as in early 2014 decided to describe the 
two trends without finding it necessary to rule on 
the matter, illustrate the Court's prudence in this 
field. 
 7.  Secondly, the cases referred to in para-
graphs 60, 63 (i), 70, 73-74 and 81 of the judgment 
clearly show that the Court has been reluctant to 
require national appellate courts to give detailed 
T1_AB_1508_bw_V03.indd   355 2/12/2015   9:42:00 PM
AB 2015/54
356 Afl. 8 - 2015 AB
AB RECHTSPRAAK BESTUURSRECHT
Stylesheet: T1 V1.4
peal which included assessment of evidence 
(bearing on the innocence of the accused) using 
standard reasoning ( ‘unanimously finds it clear 
that the appeal will not succeed’ which was equi-
valent to the formulation in the present case, see 
paragraph 15 of the judgment). 
 Admittedly, the  E.M. case dates from 1995 
and was decided by the former Commission. But 
subsequent case-law developing the principles in 
this field has not set aside or expressed reserva-
tions about the reasoning in  E.M. As regards the 
fact that the  E.M. case was a criminal one, it is my 
view that if a standard rejection formula is ac-
ceptable in respect of an appeal which includes 
the factual basis of the guilt or innocence of an 
accused, it is difficult to see why such brief reaso-
ning should not be allowed in a civil case, perhaps 
of a trivial character. According to our case-law, 
the Contracting States have greater latitude when 
dealing with civil cases, concerning civil rights 
and obligations, than when dealing with criminal 
cases (see  Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands , 27 
October 1993, § 19, Series A no. 274). 
 12.  Based on this recapitulation (paras. 5 to 
11 above), I cannot see that a filtering decision by 
a second instance based on no prospect of success 
is, as such, a violation of Article 6 § 1 if matters of 
evidence are involved. In my opinion, it does not 
follow from the case-law that there is any clear 
distinction between factual and legal issues or 
between second and third instance. Consequent-
ly, the finding of a violation in the present case 
amounts to a development in the Court's case-
law. In my view,  Hansen is not the right case for 
such a step to be taken (III), and I doubt whether 
the time is ripe to do so (IV). 
 III. The Hansen Case 
 13.  The majority observes that the High 
Court's jurisdiction was not limited to questions 
of law and procedure but extended also to ques-
tions of facts, and places emphasis on the City 
Court's decision to shorten the hearing and sub-
stantially reduce the applicant's opportunity to 
adduce witness- and documentary evidence (see 
paragraph 82). 
 14.  In my opinion, it should be noted, firstly, 
that when the applicant instituted proceedings in 
2007, he was in fact rearguing a final judgment 
in a case he had lost in 2001 — that is, six years 
earlier. Without expressing any view on the City 
Court's interpretation and application of national 
law, it seems to follow from the reading of the 
City Court's 2008 judgment that his submissions 
had no solid basis: the main issue in the case — 
the ownership of the estate — had been decided 
in 2001; the manner in which the applicant des-
cribed the crucial issue in the 2001 proceedings 
lar case, a Supreme Court may be required to give 
more adequate reasons. 
 Wnuk differs from  Hansen in at least two 
ways: the screening in  Wnuk took place in the 
Supreme Court as the third instance, and the 
case had already been examined on the merits 
by two judicial instances (the Regional Court and 
the Court of Appeal) which had full jurisdiction 
as to the facts and the law. But it is worth noting 
that the appeal to the Supreme Court included 
assessment of the evidence, that its competence 
included both facts and law, and that the Court, 
as always, based its conclusion on the individual 
circumstances of the case. 
 11.  The third case mentioned in paragraph 
80 of the present judgment is  E.M. v. Norway (no. 
20087/92, Commission decision of 26 October 
1995, Decisions and Reports (DR) no. 83-A). The 
applicant had been convicted of fraud in the City 
Court. Under the previous system of review in 
criminal cases he applied to the Appeals Leave 
Committee of the Supreme Court for a new trial 
in the High Court or, in the alternative, for leave 
to appeal to the Supreme Court. In support of 
the request for a new trial in the High Court, he 
maintained his innocence and contested the City 
Court's evaluation of the evidence. In the alterna-
tive request for leave to appeal to the Supreme 
Court he submitted that there had been certain 
procedural errors, in that the City Court's reaso-
ning was incomplete, the law had been wrong-
fully applied, and the sentence was disproportio-
nate. The Appeals Leave Committee rejected both 
requests. 
 Before the European Commission of Human 
Rights E.M. argued that Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 
to the Convention and Article 6 § 1 of the Conven-
tion had been violated. His application was decla-
red inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. The 
Commission did not find it necessary to decide 
whether the Appeals Leave Committee's decision 
amounted to a ‘determination’ of the criminal 
charge against the applicant (see para. 6 above). 
 With respect to  E.M .'s complaint that no rea-
son was given by the Appeals Leave Committee 
for its refusal to grant leave to appeal, the Com-
mission considered that if the domestic law, as in 
that case, subjects the acceptance of the appeal to 
a decision by the competent court as to whether 
it considers that the appeal raises a legal issue of 
fundamental importance and whether it has any 
chances of success, it may be sufficient for that 
court simply to reject or accept such a petition. 
 The  E.M. case is relevant in our context. The 
Commission did accept that the Appeals Leave 
Committee of the Supreme Court — acting as a 
second instance in leave-to-appeal-proceedings 
— had rejected by a unanimous decision an ap-
T1_AB_1508_bw_V03.indd   356 2/12/2015   9:42:00 PM
AB 2015/54
357Afl. 8 - 2015AB
AB RECHTSPRAAK BESTUURSRECHT
Stylesheet: T1 V1.4
cation of Article 6 depends on the special features 
of the proceedings in the domestic legal order 
and of the role of the appellate court therein, and 
the provision does not require that the rejection 
of leave to appeal be subject itself to a require-
ment to give detailed reasons. Finally, it should be 
recalled that the Court found no violation in  Helle , 
even though the Supreme Administrative Court 
could review both facts and law. 
 18.  Paragraph 83 of the judgment also ad-
dresses the fact that the High Court did not act as 
the final instance, in so far as its procedure could 
form the subject of an appeal to the Appeals Lea-
ve Committee of the Supreme Court. The majo-
rity is not persuaded that the reasons given by the 
High Court for refusing to admit his appeal ena-
bled the applicant to exercise effectively his right 
to appeal. I respectfully disagree. The effect of the 
High Court's refusal to admit the appeal was that 
the City Court's judgment, with the latter's reaso-
ning, gained legal force (see paragraphs 28 and 79 
of the present judgment). The contested issues in 
the domestic proceedings were straightforward 
and the applicant mainly insisted on arguments 
which had already been discussed and rejected 
at previous instances (and in 2001). The Appeals 
Leave Committee, which had available the same 
case-material as the High Court, was empowe-
red to fully examine the application of the law 
and the assessment of the evidence in relation to 
questions of procedure; and to review whether 
the procedure, seen as a whole, had been justi-
fiable and in conformity with,  inter alia , Article 
6 § 1, which is incorporated into Norwegian law 
and has precedence in the event of conflict (see 
paragraph 32 of the judgment). 
 19.  It is difficult to avoid the impression 
that the applicant's appeal was clearly unmeri-
torious, and I cannot see that any injustice was 
done when it was stopped at the filtering stage 
(see paragraph 25 of the judgment). Mechanisms 
serving as a deterrent against such appeals pur-
sue a legitimate aim, which has been accepted by 
the Court (see, for instance,  Monnell and Morris v. 
the United Kingdom , 2 March 1987, §§ 59, 63 and 
67, Series A no. 115). Taking into consideration 
that the applicant was afforded a fair hearing in 
the City Court; that he was warned that his ap-
peal could be refused and nonetheless presented 
further submissions; the nature of his appeal 
submissions to the High Court and the latter's 
role in the proceedings at issue, and the nature 
of its decision refusing admission of the appeal, I 
do not find, in the concrete circumstances of the 
present case, that the High Court's use of the ‘no-
prospect-of-success’ formula was incompatible 
with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 
was incorrect; and his reference to legal doctrine 
was irrelevant and based on a misunderstanding. 
 15.  Furthermore, in its decision on the ad-
missibility of evidence the City Court noted that 
all the witnesses whom the applicant wished to 
call, with one exception, had been heard in 2001. 
It further stated that the only new witness, an 
art historian, could not shed light on the issues 
of property rights. Under these circumstances I 
certainly agree with the judgment (see paragraph 
76) that the City Court did not transgress the 
normal discretion enjoyed by national courts in 
assessing the admissibility and relevance of evi-
dence. In view of the fact that the applicant had 
received the City Court's inadmissibility decision 
and judgment, both of which explained the legal 
situation and that his evidence challenging the 
2001 judgment was irrelevant, I do not agree that 
the High Court needed to elaborate its reasons in 
order for him to exercise his right to appeal ef-
ficiently. The extent to which reasons should be 
given varies according to the nature of the deci-
sion and must be determined in the light of the 
circumstances of the case (see paragraph 71 of 
the judgment). 
 16.  It is true, as stated by the majority (see 
paragraph 82), that the High Court's general ju-
risdiction was not limited to law and procedure 
but also extended to questions of facts. However, 
in the present case this is of little significance. 
The applicant's appeal mainly raised questions 
of law, and his complaint about the shortening 
of the hearing was linked to the inadmissibility 
decision, which in turn depended on what was 
legally relevant in the case. In my view, it is diffi-
cult to discern elements in the applicant's appeal 
which would require that the High Court provide 
detailed reasons when refusing admission of 
the appeal on the ground that it was clear that it 
would not succeed. 
 17.  The majority refers to  Helle v. Finland , 
19 December 1997, § 60,  Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions 1997-VIII), where the Court stated 
that the notion of a fair procedure requires that 
a national court which has given sparse reasons 
for its decision does in fact  ‘address the essential 
issues’ which were submitted to its jurisdiction 
and does  ‘not merely endorse without further 
ado the findings reached by the lower court’ . I am 
in total agreement with this statement of princi-
ple. At the same time, it should be borne in mind 
that  Helle did not concern a filtering process but 
ordinary appeal proceedings before the Supreme 
Administrative Court which — without an oral 
hearing — simply appended the reasons of the 
first-instance court without commenting on 
them. As correctly stated in the present judgment 
(see paragraphs 73 and 74) the manner of appli-
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in het arrest  Van de Hurk al dat artikel 6 EVRM 
de rechter verplicht zijn uitspraak te motiveren, 
alhoewel dit niet betekent dat hij op ieder argu-
ment een gedetailleerd antwoord moet geven. 
Het Hof was het echter in deze zaak niet eens met 
de stelling van de klager dat het College van Be-
roep voor het bedrijfsleven niet of onvoldoende 
op zijn argumenten was ingegaan. Daarbij gaf 
het Hof verder vaak aan dat een dergelijke mo-
tivering ook nodig kan zijn voor een partij om te 
kunnen beoordelen of hoger beroep zinvol is en, 
zo ja, op welke gronden (EHRM 19 april 1994,  Van 
de Hurk t. Nederland ,  NJ 1995/462 , m.nt. E.A. Al-
kema; zie ook EHRM 9 december 1994,  Ruiz Torija 
t. Spanje , Series A vol. 303-A; EHRM 9 december 
1994,  Hiro Balani t. Spanje ,  NJ 1997/20 , m.nt. E.A. 
Alkema onder  NJ 1997/21 en EHRM 27 september 
2001,  Hirvisaari t. Finland ,  EHRC 2001/77, m.nt. 
A.W. Heringa; EHRM 27 februari 2007,  Tatishvilli 
t. Rusland ,  AB 2007/324 , m.nt. T. Barkhuysen en 
Y.E. Schuurmans). 
 2. Wat interessant is in de hier opgenomen 
zaak is dat het Hof deze plicht uitdrukkelijk in 
verband brengt met rechterlijke filteringssyste-
men, zoals die in veel lidstaten van de Raad van 
Europa bestaan, waarmee omwille van de effici-
ency beroepen verkort kunnen worden afgedaan 
meestal met een standaardmotivering. Dat laat-
ste is temeer van belang nu ook Nederland derge-
lijke afdoeningsmodaliteiten kent. Hierbij valt te 
denken aan het vreemdelingenrecht waarin voor 
de Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van 
State in het hoger beroep geldt dat wanneer zij 
oordeelt dat een aangevoerde grief niet tot ver-
nietiging kan leiden, zij zich bij de vermelding 
van de gronden van haar uitspraak kan beperken 
tot dit oordeel ( artikel 91 lid 2 Vreemdelingenwet 
2000). Achtergrond hiervan is dat de wetgever 
omwille van de efficiency alleen die zaken uit-
gebreid in hoger beroep behandeld wenst te zien 
waarin dat nodig is omwille van de rechtseen-
heid, rechtsontwikkeling of algemene rechtsbe-
schermingsvragen die spelen. Een vergelijkbare 
regeling geldt voor de Hoge Raad op grond van 
 artikel 81 lid 1 RO: “Indien de Hoge Raad oor-
deelt dat een aangevoerde klacht niet tot cassatie 
kan leiden en niet noopt tot beantwoording van 
rechtsvragen in het belang van de rechtseenheid 
of de rechtsontwikkeling, kan hij zich bij de ver-
melding van de gronden van zijn beslissing be-
perken tot dit oordeel.” Welke motiveringseisen 
gelden nu in dat verband op grond van  artikel 
6 EVRM is de vraag die de hier opgenomen uit-
spraak opwerpt. Of anders geformuleerd: kunnen 
de hiervoor aangeduide verkorte afdoeningsmo-
gelijkheden van de Afdeling en de Hoge Raad 
door de EVRM-beugel? 
 IV. Final Remarks 
 20.  The finding of a violation in the  Hansen 
case may seem trivial. At the domestic level the 
matter was solved by the Norwegian Supreme 
Court, which relied on domestic systemic con-
siderations without finding it necessary to enter 
into the requirements of Article 6 of the Conven-
tion (see paragraphs 40 to 43 of the judgment). 
 21.  In my view this judgment may have 
more general repercussions which require careful 
consideration. It is clear (see paragraph 71) that 
the Convention does not compel the Contracting 
States to set up courts of appeal or of cassation, 
and it does not guarantee a right to appeal as 
such in civil cases, but persons are to enjoy the 
fundamental guarantees of Article 6 before such 
appellate courts. The Contracting States enjoy 
considerable freedom in the choice of the appro-
priate means to ensure that their judicial systems 
comply with the requirements of Article 6. 
 22.  It seems to me that the approach adopted 
at the national level differs considerably between 
the Contracting States. Specific reasoning may be 
required in some systems and more stereotyped 
reasoning may be permissible in others. I am not 
aware that there is any consensus about the ex-
tent to which reasons ought to be given when 
an appellate court refuses leave to appeal or per-
forms other kinds of filtering. More generally, it 
is established case-law that the manner of regu-
lation of the right to access to a court, including 
access to a court of appeal, is a matter in respect 
of which the Contracting States enjoy a certain 
margin of appreciation (see  Berger v. France , no. 
48221/99, § 30, ECHR 2002-X (extracts), with 
further references). 
 23.  The emphasis of the majority in this case 
on whether the filtering mechanism was compe-
tent to review factual issues may well — if applied 
generally — come as a surprise to States which 
have perceived the Court's case-law differently. 
One should not underestimate the need for fo-
reseeability in connection with the organisation 
of national judicial systems. Furthermore, the 
specific requirement to give reasons at the appeal 
levels may also be linked to the allocation of re-
sources and prioritisation of the most important 
substantive stages of the judicial process, the aim 
being to ensure that proceedings are conducted 
fairly and are concluded within a reasonable 
time. 
 Noot 
 1. De hier opgenomen uitspraak illustreert 
dat vanuit het recht op een eerlijk proces van 
 artikel 6 EVRM ook eisen aan de rechterlijke mo-
tivering worden gesteld. Zo overwoog het Hof 
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wetgeving op dit punt reeds was gewijzigd en een 
uitgebreidere motivering voorschreef. 
 5. Voor Nederland lijkt (het is een moeilijk 
te volgen casuïstische redenering van het Hof) 
dit dus geen lastig precedent nu bij ons de ver-
korte afdoeningsmogelijkheden alleen in hoogste 
instantie bestaan. Wat daarvan ook zij, dissenter 
Møse is kritisch en benadrukt de absolute vrijheid 
van staten om dit soort afdoeningsmogelijkheden 
in te richten en het gebrek aan eenduidige rege-
lingen terzake in de verschillende vedragsstaten. 
Daarbij speelt een rol het feit dat het EVRM geen 
recht op hoger beroep kent (buiten het niet voor 
Nederland geldende Zevende Protocol). Hij waar-
schuwt dat het Hof met deze uitspraak mogelijk 
toch een meer algemeen geldend precedent heeft 
geschapen, juist ook door het belang dat het Hof 
lijkt te hechten aan de motivering ten aanzien van 
meer feitelijke kwesties. Of hij daarin gelijk heeft 
betwijfelen wij, hoewel wij het eens zijn met zijn 
uitgangspunt dat staten de nodige vrijheid moe-
ten hebben bij de inrichting van verkorte afdoe-
ningsmechanismen. 
 T. Barkhuysen en M.L. van Emmerik 
 AB 2015/55 
 AFDELING BESTUURSRECHTSPRAAK VAN DE 
RAAD VAN STATE 
 12 november 2014 , nr. 201406757/1/A3 
 (Mrs. D.A.C. Slump, H.G. Lubberdink, B.P. Vermeu-
len) 
 m.nt. J.G. Brouwer en A.E. Schilder 
 Art. 8 EVRM; art. 1, 94 Gw; art. 172 lid 1, 174 lid 1 
Gemw; art. 2.40, 2:43 Apv Amsterdam 
 BA 2014/257 
 NJB 2014/2173 
 Omgevingsvergunning in de praktijk 2015/6489 
 ECLI:NL:RVS:2014:4117 
 Intocht Sinterklaas. 
 Gelet op hetgeen onder 6.3 is gesteld en in navolging 
van de uitspraak van de Afdeling van 6 augustus 
2014, wordt overwogen dat de gestelde schending 
van  artikel 8 van het EVRM in dit geval niet recht-
streeks voortvloeit uit de verlening van de evene-
mentenvergunning door de burgemeester. Zoals 
appellant 3A en anderen ter zitting uiteen hebben 
gezet, hebben zij voornamelijk bezwaar tegen de bij 
de Sinterklaasintocht betrokken figuur van ‘Zwarte 
Piet’, nu die figuur volgens hen inbreuk maakt op 
hun uit artikel 8 van het EVRM voortvloeiende recht 
op respect voor hun privéleven. De evenementen-
vergunning heeft betrekking op de in de aanvraag 
 3. Het Hof herhaalt nog eens zijn vaste ju-
risprudentie dat het EVRM niet verplicht tot het 
openstellen van hoger beroep dan wel cassatie, 
maar als een verdragsstaat dit wel doet dan dient 
hij in deze procedure de eisen van  artikel 6 EVRM 
te garanderen. Eén van deze eisen is dus de ge-
noemde motiveringsplicht, die overigens ook rust 
op lagere rechters, om betrokken partijen aldus in 
staat te stellen op effectieve wijze gebruik te kun-
nen maken van hun recht op hoger beroep. Het 
Hof roept ook — en dat is met name van belang 
als het gaat om rechterlijke filtersystemen — zijn 
jurisprudentie in herinnering dat een hoger be-
roepsrechter niet verplicht is een meer gedetail-
leerde motivering te geven in geval hij simpelweg 
de specifieke wettelijke bepaling toepast om het 
beroep niet in behandeling te nemen nu dit, zoals 
het criterium in Noorwegen was, geen kans van 
slagen heeft. Dit algemene principe heeft het Hof 
in die context ook toegepast als het gaat om een 
beroep op feitelijke gronden. Het Hof wijst er op 
dat het in deze rechtspraak geen nader onder-
scheid heeft gemaakt naar de vorm van rechter-
lijke filtersystemen (zoals het weigeren van toe-
gang tot hoger beroep dan wel een verlofstelsel) 
en evenmin naar het niveau (in tweede of derde 
instantie) waarop deze beslissing wordt geno-
men. Geen vuiltje aan de lucht voor  artikel 91 Vw 
2000 en  artikel 81 RO dus. 
 4. Toch concludeert het Hof in de concrete 
omstandigheden van het geval om een aantal — 
niet altijd goed te volgen — redenen juist wel tot 
een schending van de rechterlijke motiverings-
plicht bij het niet toelaten tot hoger beroep op 
grond van ‘het geen kans van slagen-criterium’. 
Het gerechtshof had namelijk ook rechtsmacht 
over feitelijke kwesties. Dit terwijl het beroep 
van de klager zich ook richtte op de plotselinge 
beslissing van de lagere rechter om de duur van 
de hoorzitting fors te beperken. Daardoor werd 
zijn mogelijkheid om via getuigen en documen-
ten bewijs ten aanzien van juist die feiten te le-
veren sterk beperkt. Uit de beslissing van het 
gerechtshof kan het Straatsburgse Hof daarom 
niet opmaken dat het gerechtshof op deze kern 
van de zaak is ingegaan. Verder wijst het Hof op 
het feit dat de procedure bij het gerechtshof nog 
kan worden gevolgd door cassatieberoep waarin 
zijn oordeel over de rechtsvragen en de bewijs-
waardering, voor zover dat met de gevolgde pro-
cedure samenhangt, aan de orde kan komen. Dit 
alles samen brengt het Hof tot de conclusie dat 
er (toch) sprake is van een schending van  artikel 
6 EVRM. Klager zou namelijk als gevolg van de 
gebrekkige motivering niet effectief zijn recht op 
cassatieberoep kunnen uitoefenen. Bij dit oordeel 
heeft mogelijk ook een rol gespeeld dat de Noorse 
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